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article unpacks and analyses how the UK has charted a successful course between 
the imperatives of social stability and market credibility. At the heart of this ÔsuccessÕ 
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Introduction  
The UKÕs fiscal deficit should have been eliminated by 2015. In the emergency 
budget of June 2010, the recently formed Conservative-Liberal Democratic 
Coalition government announced a mandate to reduce the deficit within five-
years. It soon became clear that this mandate would not be met within the 
timeframe and that the Coalition government missed all of the related 
borrowing targets they set within their five-year term. Yet rather than 
representing an accumulation of moments in which fiscal consolidation was 
deemed a failure on its own terms Ð which was conceivable given the 
importance that was placed upon swift deficit reduction Ð these missed 
targets barely made the political agenda or dented the legitimacy of austerity. 
Why is this so? Rather than a policy failure or aberration, I wish to suggest 
somewhat paradoxically that this target-missing phenomenon is paradigmatic 
of the logic underpinning austerity governance in the UK. Contrary to 
conventional wisdom, UK austerity is not necessarily just geared towards 
swingeing spending cuts in order to swiftly reduce the budget deficit. The 
direction of travel towards an imagined debt- and deficit-free future is as 
important as reaching that destination itself. Focussing on period spanning the 
Coalition government of 2010-15 in particular, the contribution of this article is 
twofold: to analyse and unpick this fundamentally anticipatory governing logic, 
and to characterise and thus differentiate this type of austerity governance via 
an initial comparative perspective.  
Fiscal deficit reduction involves a trade-off between competing imperatives to 
generate market credibility and to ensure social stability. The way in which 
states navigate this trade-off depends upon the context in which they find 
themselves. For instance, a number of periphery Eurozone states have had 
little autonomy in enacting fiscal consolidation. This has undoubtedly 
impacted how these states have navigated this trade-off. The way in which 
austerity is governed in this context can be characterised as disciplinary fiscal 
consolidation: disciplined by bond markets, disciplined by their monetary 
institutions, and disciplined by the terms of their international and 
supranational bailouts. The UK is different. Although somewhat 
counterintuitive, and distinct from the experiences of periphery Eurozone 
states, soaring debts and widening deficits were of little immediate threat to 
the UK. Rather it has had relative fiscal and monetary autonomy to enact fiscal 
consolidation free of direct and external discipline.  
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The UK has made use of this relative autonomy to successfully navigate this 
trade-off. It is too early at the time of writing (July 2016) to judge whether 
Brexit and the newly installed Theresa May government will follow this lead or 
chart an alternative course in relation to fiscal consolidation. Yet, in the 
preceding period, overseen by Prime Minister David Cameron and Chancellor 
George Osborne between 2010 and 2016, this trade-off was navigated with 
relative ÔsuccessÕ. While economic growth was far from stellar, the UK avoided 
a much-feted Ôdouble dipÕ recession and consistently posted figures positively 
comparable with similar economies. Meanwhile, 10-year government bond 
yields barely touched 3 per cent, which helped lower the cost of borrowing. 
Importantly, the British people never turned against austerity. The majority of 
that period was marked by public acquiescence to the Ôdebt crisisÕ narrative of 
austerity (Stanley, 2014). Public opinion polls show that the amount of people 
who believed austerity is good for the economy increased between 2011 and 
2015, while a majority consistently claimed that cutting spending to reduce the 
government's deficit is necessary (YouGov, 2015). For sure, swathes of anti-
austerity protests have been organised and some commentators have 
attempted to explain the Brexit vote through austerity Ð but this needs to be 
placed within context. Social stability remains largely intact and a legitimation 
crisis is yet to emerge. How to make sense of this? 
This article unpacks and analyses the anticipatory fiscal consolidation 
governing logic that helped make this outcome possible. Building on existing 
conceptual frameworks of Ôanticipatory actionÕ (Anderson, 2010) and of crisis 
(Hay, 1996), I show how austerity has been governed through a logic of 
anticipatory action as an intervention in an emergency situation of crisis. True 
to the etymology of crisis, the here and now was presented as a Ôturning pointÕ 
(Gamble, 2009, pp. 38-39) whereby this vague and indeterminate indebted 
future may be avoided via a Ôdecisive interventionÕ (Hay, 1996). Through 
enacting crisis, debts and deficits were positioned as a threat to the continued 
existence of this form of democratic capitalism Ð especially the imperatives of 
capital accumulation and economic growth, personal economic freedoms, and 
even the moral order of things in society. However, the nature of the threat 
from debt is vague, indeterminate and, most importantly, in the future.  
UK austerity governance is therefore necessarily anticipatory, and the 
associated governing forms prevent and preempt this indebted future by 
aiming to (i) stop the process of overspending before it reaches a point of 
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existential irreversibility and (ii) initiate new processes of permanent and 
institutionalised fiscal responsibility. As an anticipatory intervention to crisis, 
austerity is presented to the people as the thrifty and hardworking means to 
the good life for both states and households alike and to markets as a credible 
commitment to sound finances. By introducing the majority of expenditure 
cuts in the 2010 budget while maintaining the continued announcement of 
austerity throughout the five years, social stability could be matched with 
market credibility.. Rather than living within means per se, the aim of UK 
austerity governance is to uphold a credible commitment to prevent and 
preempt an indebted future. In contrast to disciplinary fiscal consolidation, in 
which the threat of deficits and debts is already present, anticipatory fiscal 
consolidation can thus centre on maintaining the direction of travel towards a 
debt-free future without necessarily rushing or reaching the destination itself.  
The article is divided into four sections. The first section begins by situating 
the article in the existing literature on the post-2008 turn to austerity. It 
unpicks the trade-off between social stability and market credibility that lies 
at the heart of austerity politics, and makes a number of observations about 
the variety of fiscal consolidation enacted in the Eurozone periphery in order 
to contextualise the UKÕs own logic. The second section outlines the two main 
sources of the anticipatory fiscal consolidation logic seen in the UK: neo-
classical economic theory, and certain trends within contemporary liberal 
governing rationalities. The third and fourth sections analyse anticipatory 
fiscal consolidation in the UK by demonstrating how austerity has been 
enacted as a form of anticipatory action that intervenes to reverse a crisis. 
The fourth section in particular addresses two puzzles regarding the slow 
introduction of expenditure cuts and the consistent failure to meet deficit-
reduction targets.  
Varieties of austerity governance 
There is a vast political economy literature on post-2008 austerity 
programmes in Europe. Broadly speaking, this literature has typically explored 
how the idea of fiscal consolidation emerged, whether the idea works, and Ð if 
so Ð how and when it should be applied (e.g. Blyth, 2013; Boyer, 2012; 
Dellepiane-Avellaneda, 2015; Hay, 2013; Konzelmann, 2014). In a similar vein, 
scholars have also analysed how austerity measures have been justified and 
contested at various levels of analysis (e.g. Ban, 2015; Clarke & Newman, 2012; 
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Huke, Clua-Losada, & Bailey, 2015; Levitas, 2012; Stanley, 2014). Political 
economists have also explained how and why fiscal deficits emerged and 
public debt swelled in the lead up to and fallout from the 2008 crisis (e.g. 
Dellepiane-Avellaneda & Hardiman, 2015; Streeck, 2014; Thompson, 2013).  
This scholarship has been accompanied with a more regionally focussed 
literature that typically places fiscal consolidation in the context of the Euro 
crisis (Hall, 2012; Johnston, Hanck, & Pant, 2014; Macartney, 2013; Sandbeck & 
Schneider, 2014; Schmidt, 2014). Although closer inspection would inevitably 
reveal variation between the cases1, there is nonetheless a set of shared 
dynamics evident in the austerity politics of the co-called periphery Eurozone 
states (i.e. Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). First of all, institutional 
asymmetries in the Eurozone institutions exacerbated domestic economic 
and fiscal weaknesses (Hall, 2012; Johnston et al., 2014); the post-2008 
economic downturn led to widened fiscal deficits and increased public debt. 
Without monetary autonomy due to the institutional design of the Eurozone, 
the periphery states had little option but to reassure bond markets through 
retrenchment, or otherwise continue to borrow at increasingly unsustainable 
levels. Rising bond yields provided elites with shared and relatively 
incontestable public evidence to build a consensus around a notion of the 
state in crisis. Their policy choices were further limited by the conditions 
attached to loans and bailouts from the Troika of the IMF, ECB and EC.  
The UK, on the other hand, faced very little market pressure. Unlike the 
periphery states, the UK had both monetary and (limited) fiscal policy-making 
autonomy, with the latter ensured through low gilt yields that made debt 
financing cheap (Thompson, 2013, pp. 486-488). This also meant that British 
politicians did not have the same market-blaming technocratic justifications 
for austerity as those in the periphery had. This meant that while the UKÕs 
debt crisis was largely self-engineered (Hay, 2013) as a governable problem as 
part of a wider process of crisis management following the financial crisis 
(Langley, 2014), austerity has not actually been implemented as fast or in the 
form promised (Berry, 2016a; Green & Lavery, 2015; Tepe-Belfrage & 
Montgomerie, 2016).  
These points of comparison are summarised in Table 1. While the UKÕs fiscal 
consolidation strategy was largely self-engineered and therefore confined in 
some ways to the space of the nation-state, those in the Eurozone were 
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constituted via transnational relations of various forms. The Eurozone variety 
of austerity governance can therefore be characterised by the external 
imposition of fiscal consolidation and the wider lack of fiscal and monetary 
autonomy, i.e. disciplinary fiscal consolidation. The British variety of fiscal 
consolidation seen in can be characterised by a relative autonomy, which this 
article will characterise as anticipatory fiscal consolidation. To be clear, 
suggesting that the context in which the UK has introduced fiscal 
consolidation differs from the Eurozone experience is hardly a novel 
observation. Simply identifying a number of diverging characteristics does not 
take us very far in terms of understanding how austerity has actually been 
governed and how this context has been utilised (or not) by the state. What, 
then, is anticipatory fiscal consolidation? And what does it involve? This is the 
focus of this article.  
Table 1. Case comparison 
 Eurozone 
periphery 
UK 
Transnational bailout Yes No 
Sustained market pressure Yes No 
Monetary policy autonomy No Yes 
Fiscal policy autonomy No Partial 
Variety of austerity governance Disciplinary Anticipatory 
 
To start addressing this question, we need to consider the basic political 
trade-offs of fiscal consolidation. Both Wolfgang Streeck (2014, pp. 79-90) and 
Vivien Schmidt (2014) consider austerity politics to be centred on a trade-off 
between the interests and expectations of Ôthe marketsÕ and Ôthe peopleÕ Ð 
although it is perhaps better termed as a trade off between social stability and 
market credibility. This requires a little unpacking.  
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States can finance themselves in many ways. Taxation, asset sales, and natural 
resource rents are all examples, as is borrowing by issuing bonds. Managing 
the expectations of bondholders and potential bondholders is a crucial part of 
state management. Generally, market participants use two shortcuts to assess 
states: (1) inflation, in which it is assumed will reduce the real value of bonds 
and therefore erode profit; and (2) budget deficits, in which it is assumed 
suggest governments may have difficulty in repaying debts and/or dampen 
growth in the long-term (Mosley, 2000). Conventional wisdom dictates that 
rising deficits cause concern among creditors regarding the security of their 
investment, therefore leading to a higher interest rate to offset risk Ð which 
can, in turn, lead to a Ôself-reinforcing vicious cycleÕ whereby the cost of 
borrowing and the difficulty of deficit reduction rise in tandem (Konzelmann, 
2014, p. 704). As well as bond markets, ÔmarketsÕ can also refer to the nebulous 
and more general notion of private-sector, financial and business interests, 
whereby it is assumed that capital accumulation and growth can be 
encouraged by speaking to the low-tax, low-interest rate and low-inflation 
preferences that prevail.  
The demand that states make credible commitments to balance the books is 
at odds with two basic democratic principles: (1) a political-ethical principle, 
whereby states are expected to be responsive to the needs and desires of 
citizens; and (2) a political-strategic principle, whereby politicians have clear 
incentives to pursue popular policies in order to secure votes. This latter 
principle is the more important for our purposes because Ô[t]he democratic 
political imperative is viewed as being at odds with the fiscal responsibility 
imperativeÕ (Posner & Blndal, 2012, p. 12). Posner and Blndal (2012, pp. 25-
31) suggest that these two imperatives can be successfully accommodated by 
engaging in the politics of blame-avoidance or by framing the need for fiscal 
consolidation in compelling terms. Since voters tend to remember the losses 
they received rather than the gains they were provided with, politicians must 
accompany fiscal consolidation with the politics of blame-avoidance in order 
to obfuscate the losses on citizens (Pierson, 1996, pp. 144-146). The social 
order can even be threatened if fiscal consolidation is severe enough.   
Anticipatory fiscal consolidation is effectively geared towards managing this 
trade-off between social stability and market credibility in the context of 
monetary and fiscal policy autonomy. As a logic of governance, it has two 
sources: the first being the assumptions of neo-classical economics as 
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particularly evident in the theory of Ôexpansionary fiscal consolidationÕ; and the 
second being a trend towards anticipatory action Ð a type of intervention that 
aims to preempt, prevent or prepare against threats to the imperatives of 
democratic capitalism Ð as a central rationality of contemporary liberal 
government. Each will be looked at in turn.  
The logic of anticipatory fiscal consolidation 
Despite Keynesian and other critical protests, the distinction between Ôgood 
austerityÕ and Ôbad spendingÕ is well-entrenched in histories of thinking about 
the economy (Blyth, 2013, p. 12). This entrenched sense of right and wrong is 
now articulated in technical accounts produced by economists, whereby 
conventional wisdom is augmented through the logic of science and therefore 
provided with an elevated epistemic status. The most famous idea in this 
respect is Reinhart and RogoffÕs theory that a 90 per cent government debt-
to-GDP threshold causes a systematic slowdown in economic growth. Despite 
being invoked by elites to justify fiscal consolidation, the theory was much 
maligned (e.g. Lysandrou, 2013) and was eventually discredited all together 
(Herndon, Ash, & Pollin, 2014).  
Just as important is the idea of Ôexpansionary fiscal consolidationÕ. Blyth (2013, 
pp. 170-176), Konzelmann (2014, pp. 722-23), and Dellepiane-Avellaneda (2015) 
trace the development of economic theories that claim expenditure-focused 
fiscal consolidation may counterintiutively foster rather than hinder economic 
growth. The crux of the idea is that generating a credible deficit-reduction 
plan can effectively manage expectations. Invoking ideas of Ricardian 
equivalence, Robert Barro (1974, 1989) famously challenged the expansionary 
impact of fiscal deficits. Any expansionary effects of deficit-fuelled stimulus, he 
argued, would be cancelled out by expectations: market participants would 
curb their spending and instead save in anticipation of future tax increases to 
finance the government debt created through deficit-spending. The so-called 
ÔBocconi BoysÕ Ð a group of pro-austerity economists associated with Bocconi 
University, including the Harvard economist Alberto Alesina Ð extended this 
line of argument (Blyth, 2013, pp. 170-171). The general argument, developed 
over several decades, essentially claimed that expenditure-based fiscal 
consolidation will generate confidence among businesses, investors and 
consumers and that, by extension, reduced public spending would Ôcrowd inÕ a 
private sector-led recovery.   
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These seemingly arcane economic theories were filtered into principles of 
best practice articulated by key international institutions such as the IMF and 
OECD2 (Dellepiane-Avellaneda, 2015, p. 6). For Posner and Blndal (2012, p. 14), 
the Ôforemost principleÕ of expansionary fiscal consolidation is in establishing 
or announcing a credible plan in order to manage the expectations of Ôkey 
economic and financial playersÕ. This principle can be logically extended in 
different ways. For instance, since state action before Ôa market crisis forces 
their handÕ can ensure that governments safely navigate both the economic 
and political dangers of ever-expanding deficits (Posner & Blndal, 2012, p. 17), 
fiscal consolidation is therefore perhaps best introduced in anticipation of 
market pressure rather than in reaction to it. Or, to expand the logic in a 
different way, since the mechanism of expansion involves generating 
confidence through a credible plan, the mere Ôannouncement of a plan to 
reduce deficits and retire public debtsÕ (Konzelmann, 2014, pp. 722-23, 
emphasis added) would be hypothetically effective at least in the short term.  
The Conservative-led Coalition mirrored this best practice in introducing 
fiscal consolidation. Rather than wait until markets forced their hands (at least 
in respect to bond yields), the government acted pre-emptively in announcing 
and implementing fiscal consolidation. Although this process is analysed in 
detail in the next section, it is important to briefly draw out a few initial points 
here. It is for instance clear that Osborne and other leading Conservatives 
clearly alluded to the logic and rationale of expansionary fiscal consolidation 
and the need to manage future expectations when justifying austerity. In one 
speech, for instance, Osborne underlined the importance of Ôexpectations and 
confidenceÕ: Ôa credible fiscal consolidation plan will have a positive impact [on 
consumption and investment, and hence growth] through greater certainty 
and confidence about the futureÕ (Osborne, 2010awith emphasis added). 
Managing expectations is a performative exercise, inasmuch that this 
governing strategy Ð influenced by the assumptions of Ricardian equivalence 
and rational expectations Ð often becomes both the means and ends of 
economic governance. This has been shown most clearly by the path-breaking 
scholarship on central banks and monetary policy, in which the likes of Holmes 
(2009) and Braun (2015) have demonstrated how communicative acts 
constitute the conditions for the formation and coordination of private sector 
expectations. ÔCredibilityÕ can therefore be enacted via a performative 
utterance. DraghiÕs promise to do whatever it takes to save the euro is a now 
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famous instance of this (C. Holmes, 2014). The logic of anticipatory fiscal 
consolidation examined here can therefore be performative in, what 
MacKenzie (2006, p. 18) would call, an ÔeffectiveÕ way because the use of 
economic theory makes a difference. As Esposito (2013, p. 103) puts it, the 
concept of performativity usefully highlights Ôthe need to abandon the idea of 
an external observer observing the world (and speaking about the world), 
without being involved in its processesÕ. 
The second source of anticipatory fiscal consolidation is a trend in the central 
rationality of contemporary liberal government to intervene in order to 
preempt, prevent or prepare against threats to liberal democracies. Ben 
Anderson (2010) characterises this as Ôanticipatory actionÕ, and in doing so 
places this kind of intervention in the context of the evolving rationalities of 
liberal government. To briefly summarise, advanced liberal democracies are 
characterised by new forms of governmental power. Traditional forms of 
sovereign power over the territory of the state have been complemented with 
a biopolitical governing rationality, whereby the aim of state power is geared 
towards securing life in addition to securing sovereignty (Dillon, 2007, p. 43). 
Within this rationality, certain types of liberal life are valued and protected 
over others (Anderson, 2010, p. 782). The aim of liberal government is Ôthus to 
create the conditions in which the entrepreneurial opportunities for wealth, 
well-being, and security, seemingly afforded by the vital and uncertain 
processes of population, can be realizedÕ (Langley, 2014, pp. 22-23; see also 
Miller & Rose, 1990).  
Anticipatory action is as a type of intervention imbued within these governing 
rationalities. It involves acting in advance of a future disaster that: (1) is 
potentially catastrophic, at least in respect to the capital accumulation, 
personal economic freedoms, and moral order of things that constitute British 
democratic capitalism; (2) has a vague, ambiguous or complex source; and (3) 
is imminent Ð perhaps even described in terms of a crisis Ð and therefore in 
need of Ôdecisive interventionÕ (Hay, 1996) to secure democratic capitalism 
(Anderson, 2010, pp. 779-780). In these situations, time can take strange forms 
whereby Ô[n]ot only is the present on the verge of disaster, but disaster is 
incubating within the presentÕ (Anderson, 2010, p. 780). Intervention aims to 
therefore simultaneously steer the present away from the threshold of 
disaster and secure some sort of imagined future. Climate change and 
 11 
terrorism are two areas in which these forms of anticipatory action have been 
particularly researched (De Goede & Randalls, 2009). 
Anderson divides anticipatory action into three parts: logics, styles, and 
practices. Before intervening into the present and acting upon the future (i.e. 
logics), the future needs to be Ôdisclosed and related to through statements 
about the futureÕ (i.e. styles) and made present through various methods (i.e. 
practices) (Anderson, 2010, pp. 779-780). More specifically, styles refer to the 
ways in which the future is ÔproblematizedÕ. While the most obvious examples 
can be found in modern technologies of risk and probability, the main style 
associated with anticipatory action is ÔpremediationÕ in which the future is 
disclosed and related to as Ôa disruptive surpriseÕ. In these instances, the 
future cannot be grasped through prediction or through statistics to analyse 
an archive of past events. Meanwhile, there are a number of practices that 
make the future present and knowable. For purposes of this article, there are 
two types of practice: (1) calculation, whereby numbers, statistics, and figures 
are used to make the future actionable through Ôthe numericalization of a 
reality to comeÕ (Anderson, 2010, p. 784); and (2) imagination, whereby the 
future is imagined Ôas ifÕ they were real through Ôforms of visualization (such as 
images, symbols, and metaphors) [and] forms of narrativization (such as 
stories)Õ (Anderson, 2010, p. 785). These styles and practices enable 
anticipatory action. 
Anticipatory action has a number of different logics in which interventions are 
legitimised and enacted (Anderson, 2010, p. 788). The two most important for 
our purposes here are: (1) precaution, whereby future disaster is averted 
through stopping a process before a point of irreversibility; and (2) 
preemption, whereby future disaster is anticipated through initiating a new 
process. Precaution involves intervening in a situation that could be 
catastrophic before the tipping point for that potential and uncertain outcome 
is actually reached. There is therefore a constant trade-off in assessing the 
costs of a potentially disastrous future versus the various political and 
economic costs of immediate intervention. In contrast, preemption follows a 
logic in which a threat of danger is more indeterminate or is yet to properly 
emerge in a manner that engenders precautionary action.  This logic involves 
acting to preempt a threat, and is therefore less ÔparasiticÕ and more ÔcreativeÕ 
than precautionary action. As Anderson explains, Ô[i]n relation to a present that 
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is unbalanced by potential threats, preemptive logics work by unleashing 
transformative events in order to avoid a ruptureÕ (Anderson, 2010, p. 790).  
Although Anderson does not explore the relationship between crisis and 
anticipatory action, there are clear crossovers (Langley, 2014, pp. 4, 29). 
Building on existing work (especially Hay, 1996), crisis can be seen as a 
particular moment in time whereby the present is pregnant with the 
possibility of transformation; a turning point in which an imagined future is 
either prevented (a logic of precaution) or realised (a logic of prevention) 
through a Ôdecisive interventionÕ. As we will see, crisis is an important part of 
anticipatory fiscal consolidation in the UK.  
Taken together, neo-classical economic theories and trends toward 
anticipating future threats are two major sources in the logic of anticipatory 
fiscal consolidation. By launching Ð or even just announcing Ð a credible 
expenditure-based fiscal consolidation plan, bond market pressure can be 
prevented and preempted while simultaneously signposting to investors and 
businesses that future tax rises are unlikely. The fiscal consolidation plan must 
be sufficiently high profile in order to be manage expectations and therefore 
generate credibility. This is both in regards to sufficiently convincing market 
participants about the direction of future state action, but also in 
demonstrating to market participants that there is sufficient political 
wherewithal to follow that path given contrasting political imperatives to 
maintain social order and electoral support. In order to be successful 
according to its internal logic, anticipatory fiscal consolidation requires 
consistent and persistent high profile communication about the requirement 
for balancing the budget primarily through expenditure cuts before there is 
clear market pressure to do so. Speaking to the market in this manner is at 
odds in speaking to the people, because it involves explicitly telling citizens 
what is coming. Conventional wisdom dictates that voters do not generally 
support those that are promising some sort of tax raising and expenditure 
cutting combination. This provides the central dilemma for those enacting 
anticipatory fiscal consolidation: how to ÔsuccessfullyÕ govern while meeting 
the expectations of both the people and market when consolidation by stealth 
is no longer an option. 
The remainder of the article explores this puzzle, with the next two sections 
outlining how anticipatory fiscal consolidation was enacted in the UK. The first 
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outlines the practices that rendered the future present as a problem 
requiring intervention. This was done through the combination of calculations 
of a debt-riddled future through national accounting and through imagining 
what that debt-riddled future would mean for the moral order of economy 
and society. The second then outlines the precautionary and preemptive 
logics that these practices helped engender.   
Making a crisis to anticipate an indeterminate threat 
It is strange to think that the Conservative party pledged to Ôsupport the 
[Labour] GovernmentÕs spending plansÕ (Cameron, 2007) as recently as 2007. 
By 2008 their tune had changed. One of the key messages during this period 
was to Ôbalance the budgetÕ and to Ôput sound money firstÕ so to move beyond 
and repair LabourÕs ÔAge of IrresponsibilityÕ (Osborne, 2008capitalisation in 
original). Instead of a focus on Ôsharing the proceeds of growthÕ, the 
importance of Ôpaying down the debtÕ emerges as the primary Conservative 
economic message (Cameron, 2009c). The change in tack occurred with a 
deterioration of the UKÕs fiscal position, whereby the budget deficit widened 
from 3 per cent of GDP in 2007 to 5 per cent in 2008. Although this widening is 
frequently explained to the bank bailouts, those interventions by the UK state 
were excluded from the budget balance sheet (Thompson, 2013, p. 474). 
Instead, the UKÕs fiscal deficit was the result of three factors: New Labour 
deficit-fuelled spending from 2002 onwards, a further 7 percent discretionary 
increase in public expenditure as a proportion of GDP from 2007-2010 (most 
of which was spent on health), and falling tax receipts (particularly from the 
financial industry, which halved between 2006 and 2009) (Thompson, 2013, 
pp. 474-475). This provided ammunition for elites to speak of a debt crisis. 
However, a fiscal deficit makes a crisis not. Most observers would agree that a 
balanced budget is preferable, to be sure, but this does not mean that running 
a fiscal deficit is not an automatic prelude to a debt crisis. Instead, deficits are 
normally considered a problem when there is market pressure in the form of 
increasing interest rates. When this sends the cost of borrowing spiralling, the 
level of sovereign debt swells Ð which is usually assumed to eventually slow 
growth down. It is therefore reasonable to consider sustained market 
pressure as an emergency situation in which a credibility-enhancing 
intervention is required. This simply is not what happened in the UK. Interest 
rates remained low consistently low. With monetary policy autonomy, there is 
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and was little danger that the UK would default on its debts. Indeed, gilt yields 
actually fell in the period following the global financial crisis (which some 
attribute to a Ôflight to qualityÕ as investors favoured low-risk assets). While 
there was little threat within the immediate present, there were dangers 
lurking in the future Ð which were brought to the fore through two sets of 
practices.  
First, the future was problematised through practices of calculation. On the 
one hand, these practices were fairly simple and not necessarily systematised. 
When expenditures outstrip revenues, the state must borrow to bridge the 
gap; debt will indefinitely accumulate until the shortfall is eradicated. Yet on 
the other hand, more complex practices were required to properly 
problematise the future. For example, it was frequently observed that the UK 
was running a structural deficit, which, unlike a cyclical deficit, the push and 
pull of economic performance cannot account for. Yet a number of contingent 
assumptions about potential growth and spare capacity underpin this 
relatively simple conceptual distinction in practice (Thompson, 2013, pp. 474-
475). Other practices of fiscal forecasting were used to demonstrate the 
future decline of the UKÕs fiscal position under present conditions Ð although 
it should be noted that these techniques are Ônotoriously inaccurate, at bestÕ 
(Langley, 2014, p. 155). After all, the March 2008 budget projected the UK to be 
running a budget surplus by 2012-3 (HM-Treasury 2008: 27). As Paul Langley 
shows (2014, p. 155), the UK state went further than this by using IMF research 
to quantify the exact problem with rising sovereign debt. The June 2010 
emergency budget therefore argues that for 10 per cent increase in sovereign 
debt as a proportion of GDP will, among other results, lead to an annual 0.25 
per cent reduction in economic growth (HM-Treasury, 2010a). This form of 
calculation would reach its nadir with the use of Reinhart and RogoffÕs 90 per 
cent threshold theory (Osborne, 2011). These calculative practices effectively 
problematised the future by demonstrating how running a fiscal deficit was a 
long-term threat to British economic prosperity.  
Second, imagining what this debt-riddled future would look like and what 
would it mean for the moral order of things also problematised the future. 
Indeed, a vague and encompassing concept of debt was the source of this 
problematisation, which was sometimes construed as the fault of all and 
sometimes the fault of the previous Labour government:  
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 Ô[Britain] borrowed and borrowed as if the party would never end. Banks did. 
Businesses did. Families did. And so did this governmentÕ (Osborne, 2008). 
ÔWe're in this mess because of too much debt - too much government debt; too much 
corporate debt; too much personal debt. This is Labour's Debt Crisis, and it becomes 
clearer all the time that the scale of Britain's debts puts us in a much weaker position 
than other countriesÕ (Cameron, 2009b).  
A central part of this narrative was the sense that past profligacies had to be 
corrected. For example, it is within this context that Labour Ôbankrupted our 
country, [and] left a legacy of debts and cutsÕ (Cameron, 2010) and Ôeverybody 
knows that LabourÕs Debt Crisis means public spending cutsÕ (Cameron, 
2009a). Correcting these past profligacies was essential for securing the 
future prosperity of the country. In late 2010 Osborne claimed that Ôfor the 
first time in our history, the nationÕs credit rating was at risk É For look at 
Ireland, and Greece, and Portugal, and you will see that the dangers have not 
passedÕ (Osborne, 2010b). This aspect of the debt crisis narrative was held 
together by, more than anything, popular wisdom about the requirement that 
debts are a bad thing that ought to be avoided.  
A moral rather than economic logic underpins this debt crisis, as highlighted 
by consistent comparisons between the state and households in requiring to 
Ôlive within meansÕ. For instance, it was claimed that Labour in effect 
Ôborrowed and borrowed and borrowed on our nation's credit cardÕ 
(Osborne, 2010d), but the Conservatives Ôwill make sure Britain starts Ôliving 
within our meansÕ [É] [t]his is what households up and down the country doÕ 
(Cameron, 2008). As many have pointed out by many, this comparison is 
fallacious and misleading (Konzelmann, 2014, p. 732). While critiquing this logic 
from a rational viewpoint is important, it is equally important to note that the 
comparison has an inherently moral foundation. After all, that Ôthe state should 
act like a responsible householdÕ is, in the final analysis, a claim that is 
saturated with moral meaning (Stanley, 2014). Ultimately this invocation is 
rooted in a sense of what ÔgoodÕ households ought to do. This was taken to a 
logical extreme by Conservative MP Caroline Spelman who claimed that ÔthriftÕ 
is an appropriate economic policy for both the state and households: Ôlets call 
it thrift then because thrift is a virtue and thrift needs to be part of the 
solution to our nationÕs problems [...] thrift is living within your meansÕ (quote 
from Jensen, 2012, p. 22). 
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The debt crisis has been enacted alongside a narrative of ÔBroken BritainÕ: a 
condition of serial and interlinked social pathologies Ð worklessness, personal 
irresponsibility, out-of-wedlock childbirth, dependency Ð caused by 
behavioural problems and family breakdown (Slater, 2013, p. 948). The Broken 
Britain narrative, which has been the main public justification for the sweeping 
(and arguably damaging) changes to welfare, originated in the work of the 
former Work and Pensions Secretary Iain Duncan SmithÕs think tank Centre 
for Social Justice (Slater, 2013, p. 951). Duncan SmithÕs ÔSocial Justice Policy 
GroupÕ Ð commissioned by then-new Conservative leader David Cameron in 
2007 Ð reported that an ÔunderclassÕ lived a life of dependency, addiction, debt 
and family breakdown, supported by a Ômentality of entrapment, where 
aspiration and hope are for other people, who live in another placeÕ (Finlayson, 
2010, p. 25). As Alan Finlayson points out, there is an important link between 
this corrosion of social life and the ways in which the excesses of big 
government have undermined responsibility (Finlayson, 2010, pp. 25-26). The 
Broken Britain narrative suggests that mass irresponsibility can be traced to a 
rights-based and dependency culture that was fostered by a social democratic 
New Labour state (Finlayson, 2010, p. 26). Importantly, the erroneous use of 
public money is implied to have played a role in fostering this culture. This 
diagnosis suggests both a withdrawal of the state from various areas as 
evident in much Conservative-coalition government policy such as free 
schools, but it also leads to state intervention through trying to change 
dominant social norms of dependency and unproductive behaviour through 
behavioural economics (Finlayson, 2010, p. 29). 
Merely than just a threat to economic growth, the debt and deficit also 
therefore represent an affront to Ôa particular kind of moral orderÕ (Konings, 
2016, p. 98). This is a moral order in which those that work, are directly taxed, 
and therefore contribute to the public purse should be the ones to also 
benefit because they deserve it. But the concern is that exactly the opposite is 
happening, in which there are groups of people who receive welfare benefits 
but contribute no direct tax to the public purse and are therefore 
undeserving. This moral order is supported by a number of stereotypes: 
hardworking taxpayers who are pitted against the undeserving (Stanley, 2016), 
strivers pitted against scroungers (Valentine & Harris, 2014), and so on 
(Jensen & Tyler, 2015). This has implications for the governing austerity. As 
Langley puts it, it appears only Ôright and proper É that those who had 
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apparently benefitted most from public spending that the state could ill-afford 
would now endure the costs of the spending cutsÕ (Langley, 2014, p. 163). By 
changing their ways, the undeserving poor will not only help themselves, but 
will help the state by becoming economically productive, relieving the strain of 
welfare on the budget, and, ultimately, help solve the crisis.  
Taken together, these calculative practices and imaginaries create a sense 
that a pernicious threat is facing the country. This danger is potentially 
catastrophic, the sources of it are complex, and the moment of tipping point is 
imminent. As Colin Hay (1996) argues, that moment, in which the present is 
pregnant with possibility, is the true moment of crisis whereby a Ôdecisive 
interventionÕ is required to either prevent or realise an imagined future. In this 
case, crisis was enacted by positioning the debt and deficit as a direct and/or 
symbolic threat to the capital accumulation, personal economic freedoms, and 
moral order of things that constitute British democratic capitalism. Those that 
deviate from these imperatives are by definition a threat to it, and so one 
ought to get what one gives, i.e. deserving taxpayers and hardworking families. 
Given the character of the crisis, an intervention of just spending cuts Ð i.e. 
just narrowing the deficit Ð is not enough to solve the problem. Instead, 
society needs to be reoriented back towards this way of life, and the moral 
authority of the taxpaying hardworking family needs to be reasserted. This 
way of life is not under immediate threat. Indeed, the nature of the threat is 
vague, indeterminate, and, most importantly, in the future. 
Preventing and preempting an indebted future 
These calculative practices and imaginaries position the UKÕs indebted future 
as a threat to the imperatives of democratic capitalism. Austerity is therefore 
an intervention to prevent and preempt this future becoming a reality by living 
within means. As a result, austerity is presented as the thrifty and hardworking 
means to the good life for both states and households alike. This therefore 
engendered a number of interventions Ôin the here and nowÕ that need to be 
Ôlegitimized, guided and enactedÕ through different logics (Anderson, 2010, p. 
12). In terms of governing logics, the threat of an indebted future was 
anticipated by: (i) stopping the process and underlying causes of 
overspending before it reaches a point of existential irreversibility (a logic of 
prevention); and (ii) initiating new processes of permanent and 
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institutionalised fiscal responsibility (a logic of preemption). I will now 
elaborate on how this played out in practice.   
First, this indebted future needed to be prevented. The Coalition government 
promised to eliminate the deficit within 5 years. To do so, they announced an 
overall fiscal consolidation programme of £112.6bn via the emergency June 
2010 budget and the October 2010 spending review. Of this, £29.8bn was to be 
through tax rises (e.g. increase in highest tax rate, increase in National 
Insurance contributions, VAT rise) and £82.8bn through cutting expenditure 
(Taylor-Gooby & Stoker, 2011, p. 5). This included cutting £17.7bn from the 
benefits bill Ð almost all of which was to come from the £105bn already being 
spent on short term housing and disability benefits (Taylor-Gooby & Stoker, 
2011, p. 5). Within speeches and accompanying documents, audiences were 
consistently reminded that these budgetary measures were being initiated in 
order to secure the countryÕs future and that now was the time to act so as to 
avoid reaching a point of irreversibility. Consider the following excerpt from a 
George Osborne speech that accompanied the announcement of spending 
cuts two weeks into the Coalition government:  
We need to tackle the deficit so that our debt repayments don't spiral out of 
control. The more we do now, the more we can spend on the things that really 
matter in the years ahead. Already we are paying out more on debt interest 
that we spend on defence, on transport or on the police. If we don't take 
action, we will soon be spending more on servicing our debts than on 
educating our children. Those who are serious about engaging in the debate 
about Britain's economic future need to provide answers to these problems. 
[É] We are doing this for a reason. Controlling spending is not an end in itself. 
[É] This is just the first step towards creating better public services, a 
stronger economy and a fairer society (Osborne, 2010c). 
By their very scale, these interventions appeared likely to transform and 
restructure public services in otherwise unthinkable ways. 
When cuts to public spending are announced during a budget, it sounds and 
feels very immediate. However, there is little immediacy given the 
administrative difficulty of Ôtaking awayÕ as opposed to Ôgiving awayÕ (Pierson, 
1996, p. 144). Although 73 per cent of planned tax increases were implemented 
by 2011-12, only 12 per cent of the planned total cuts to public service spending 
were implemented (Emmerson, Johnson, & Miller, 2012, p. 47). Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, cuts to public investment (34 per cent of proposed by 2011-12) 
were the easiest (Emmerson et al., 2012, p. 68). Only 12 per cent of planned 
cuts to welfare spending were implemented by 2011-12 (Emmerson et al., 2012, 
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p. 68). On the one hand, this could matter a great deal if the terms of the crisis 
are earnestly followed. Yet, on the other hand, this inevitably slow 
implementation of fiscal consolidation is politically fortunate (because it 
dampens the impact of spending cuts on the fabric of social life) and 
consistent with the logic of anticipatory fiscal consolidation (because the UK is 
being seen as moving in the right direction). On this latter point, it is the 
direction of travel rather than the speed (or even reaching the destination) 
that really matters when building credibility. For that is the character of 
expectation management and indeed this form of anticipatory action more 
generally.  
Despite this, it might be nevertheless tempting to speak of an Ôausterity stateÕ 
and conjure images of a lean and mean cutting machine, whereby all state 
action is financially constrained by the logic of this crisis. This is simply not the 
case. The point is that this logic of precaution is selective, and if certain areas 
are considered important in securing the future of British democratic 
capitalism despite costing the state then they are valued nonetheless. Recent 
pension reforms, in which people are now automatically enrolled in private 
pensions alongside proposals for a new single-tier state pension, highlight this. 
Despite costing the state more in the long term, these reforms are justified as 
a way of ensuring that individuals take more personal responsibility for their 
long-term financial security and must Ôand engage intimately with the financial 
services industry to do soÕ (Berry, 2016b, p. 2). Despite costing the state and 
seemingly contradicting the imperative of austerity (Berry, 2016b), these 
reforms are valued because they secure way of life compatible with the 
imagined futures of British democratic capitalism. This is one reason why it 
makes sense to think of austerity as an imperative to Ôlive within meansÕ. Not 
pure asceticism, but rather selective and thrifty uses of decreasing levels of 
expenditure in which those areas that help secure the future are valued over 
those that do not.  
This logic of precaution has been accompanied with a logic of preemption, in 
which the state initiated new processes of permanent and institutional fiscal 
responsibility. The establishment of the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) 
provides a high-profile example of this. The OBR is tasked with making 
independent assessments of the public finances and the economy, the public 
sector balance sheet and the long-term sustainability of the public finances. 
Given that Gordon BrownÕs Treasury team were consistently accused of 
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massaging forecasting figures to fit their ends, the chance to Ôremove politics 
from forecastingÕ was the key justification for forming the OBR (HM-Treasury, 
2010b, p. 2) Ð despite the fact that it used the same models as the Treasury 
used previously (Sawyer, 2012, p. 208). By creating an at-distance independent 
body that seeks to create objective forecasts, the OBR simultaneously is part 
of the resolution of crisis the re-iteration of crisis itself. It provides the deficit 
problem Ôan additional veneer of expert objectivity, transparency, and 
vigilanceÕ (Langley, 2014, p. 156). In amongst this, the OBR is also geared toward 
pre-empting another slide toward an indebted future and the threats that 
entails even in a (hypothetical and imagined) world where the UK has a 
balanced budget. More recently, the Conservative 2015 pre-election Ôtax lockÕ 
pledge (a promise that neither income tax, VAT or national insurance will be 
increased in the subsequent parliament) and the recent ÔCharter for Budget 
ResponsibilityÕ (in which fiscal surpluses are enshrined in law) continue this 
logic.  
Characterising the austerity governance in the UK as following a logic of 
anticipatory fiscal consolidation helps us unpick two puzzles about the 
unfolding of fiscal consolidation that are usually ignored or otherwise 
insufficiently grappled with in the academic literature. The first of these two 
puzzles concerns the observation about targets outlined at the beginning of 
the article. In this vein, some observers have commented on the Coalition 
governmentÕs Ôfailure to meet its borrowing targets and effective admissions 
that the five-year plan will not be realisedÕ (Thompson, 2013, p. 487). Under 
many circumstances Ð and perhaps especially under a logic of disciplinary 
fiscal consolidation Ð this consistent failure to meet fiscal deficit reduction 
targets might provide a series of moments or an accumulation of evidence 
that the CoalitionÕs initial 5 year fiscal consolidation plan failed on the very 
terms it set out. Yet, these missed targets barely dented the legitimacy of 
austerity governance.  
To gain an understanding of why this is so, we can turn to the character of the 
Ôforward-looking fiscal mandateÕ (HM-Treasury, 2010a, p. 1) seeks to achieve a 
cyclically-adjusted current balance by the end of a rolling, five year forecast 
period. The fiscal mandate is therefore quite literally a moving target: with 
each new budget there is a new five-year forecast, and therefore a new target 
of sorts with a calculation of the likelihood of meeting it in that timeframe. So, 
the 2011 budget claimed that there was Ôa greater than 50 per cent chanceÕ of 
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meeting the mandate. By 2012, there was Ôroughly a 60 per cent chanceÕ of 
meeting it by 2016-17. By 2013, there was Ôroughly a 70 per cent chanceÕ of 
meeting it by 2017-18. And by 2014, there was Ôa roughly 75 per cent chanceÕ 
meeting it by 2018-19. By the time we get to 2015, there is absolutely no chance 
of meeting the ÔrollingÕ and Ôfuture-orientedÕ target set in 2010 Ð but the 
Treasury can still claim credibility in steering the UK in the right direction. This 
device more so than anything else demonstrates the logic of anticipatory fiscal 
consolidation: it is the direction of travel rather than the speed or even 
reaching the destination itself that really matters. For with each reiteration 
and recalculation of the fiscal mandate, that imagined debt-free future 
seemed closer.  
The second of these two puzzles concerns the tempo of fiscal consolidation. It 
is becoming clearer now that the spending cuts were almost exclusively 
concentrated in the first 2010 emergency budget. Using data from the 
Treasury, The Guardian calculated the cumulative estimated effect of the 
policy decisions over the following five financial years after the budget. Figure 
1 shows how the June 2010 emergency budget was essentially one short and 
sharp bout of consolidation, followed by just very modest action following 
that. Again, this seems at odds with the seeming urgency of fiscal 
consolidation as presented by the Coalition government and its key players. 
This seems all the more incongruous when we consider that at Osborne stood 
up and spoke about the importance of continued austerity and spending cuts 
at each of those relatively lighter budgets following 2010. Why risk the promise 
of more pain, only not to deliver? On the surface, this pattern also seems odd 
given the primacy of deficit-reduction targets. 
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However, as we saw moments ago, the fiscal mandate is assembled in a 
particular way that makes this tempo both conceivable and successful. 
Furthermore, and since the actual spending cuts that stem from budgetary 
decisions can take years to implement, this strategy has probably ensured that 
austerity has not lead to the breakdown in social stability that many 
predicted3. By delegating a large chunk of austerity to the future Ð as partly 
legitimatised through the fiscal mandate and other practices reviewed above Ð 
the UK state ensure the successful governance of austerity in regards to 
treading a path between social stability and market credibility.  
Conclusion 
This article has sought to analyse the logic underpinning austerity governance 
in the UK. Rather than simply identify the contrasting levels of fiscal and 
monetary autonomy as a causal explanation for divergent types of austerity 
governance in comparison to the Eurozone, the article has instead sought to 
unpack and analyse how the UK has made use of those contrasting conditions 
to chart a successful course between the imperatives of social stability and 
market credibility.  
The article started by distinguishing the context of the UK from the Eurozone 
as a way of outlining the competing imperatives of social stability and market 
credibility that anticipatory fiscal consolidation is geared towards managing. It 
then outlined this anticipatory governing logic further by outlining its origins in 
neo-classical economic theory and in the wider rationalities of contemporary 
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liberal government. The third section demonstrated how the UK state made a 
crisis in order to anticipate a potential catastrophe to the country Ð although 
the exact character of the threat posed by the deficit and debt was vague, 
indeterminate, and yet to be realised. The final section outlined some of the 
anticipatory practices that sought to prevent and preempt this imagined 
future, which included various budgeting and forecasting institutions and 
devices. In doing so, the article engages with what I previously termed as the 
second phase of austerity literature, in which the aim is to systematically make 
sense of how fiscal consolidation has been governed. This article has 
contributed to this literature by analysing and unpicking the logic 
underpinning austerity governing in the UK, and in seeking to characterise and 
thus differentiate this type of austerity governance. 
The ideal-typical categories of anticipatory and disciplinary fiscal 
consolidation can help navigate the differentiated and uneven political 
economy of austerity from a comparative perspective. However, it is 
important to emphasise, as way of a concluding, what the category of 
anticipatory means in this context. After all, liberal government Ð let alone 
different types of austerity governance Ð is future-oriented to an extent. The 
category of anticipatory is instead used to make sense of the under-
acknowledged and uneven temporalities of austerity governance. Within the 
logic of disciplinary fiscal consolidation, the future is relatively fixed and far 
more likely to catch up with the state Ð to the extent that the imperatives of 
social stability and market credibility are compromised. Within the logic of 
anticipatory fiscal consolidation, the future is flexible to the extent that it is 
malleable to the governing practices of the state. This is evident in the way in 
which austerity has been governed in the UK. Consequently, sustaining a 
credible journey towards a debt-free and deficit-free future in order to 
prevent and preempt a vague and indeterminate threat to the country is as 
important as actually reaching the destination itself. How long the state can 
credibly commit to this continued and longer-than-promised journey Ð and, 
indeed, whether it will at all given the fallout from Brexit Ð without 
compromising social stability or market credibility is to be seen.  
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1
 Blyth (2013, 62-73), for instance, makes a distinction between Ireland and Spain (where 
financial crises were caused by housing bubbles) and Portugal and Italy (which are Ôunited by 
a combination of low growth, old age, low productivity, and institutional sclerosisÕ).  
2
 It should be noted that although expansionary fiscal consolidation was for a while embraced 
by influential epistemic communities, including the IMF, it was latterly discredited and 
rejected by those some of those same communities (Ban 2014). 
3
 We may also surmise that there may be a relationship between the slow tempo of fiscal 
consolidation and the dampening of aggregate demand. This article does not have the space 
to explore such a possibility.  
